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Abstract 
 
The topic of this paper is the perception of properties. It is argued that the perception of 
properties allows for a distinction between the sense of the identity and the sense of the 
qualitative nature of a property. So, for example, we might perceive a property as being 
identical over time even though it is presented as more and more determinate. Thus, you 
might see an object first as red and then as crimson red. In this case, the property is perceived 
as identical over time, even though the sense of the qualitative nature (the redness, the 
crimson redness) of the property is changing. The distinction between the sense of identity 
and the sense of quality is explicated in terms of perceiving a particular property, a trope, and 
perceiving it as an instance of a universal. It is subsequently argued that the perceived tropes 
cannot constitute the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience.  
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The topic of the present paper is the perception of tropes. It offers a novel argument to the 
effect that, even though we can perceive tropes, the perceived tropes themselves are not the 
constituents of the phenomenal character of our perceptions. Despite the fact that tropes 
feature prominently in the modern ontological discussion of properties, and despite the fact 
that properties feature prominently in most theories of perception, tropes rarely feature in 
discussions concerning the nature of perception.1 There are obviously exceptions; the claim 
that we can perceive tropes is present already in Husserl’s Logical Investigations, where it is 
defended for perhaps the first time in the literature (Husserl 1900/01, Mulligan 1995, 173ff.). 
But the literature on the possibility of perceiving tropes is not vast, and I believe that my 
argument is new. 
   A trope is a particular property. If two objects exactly resemble each other with respect to 
some property, they will have different tropes. Properties are according to trope-theory 
particulars just as much as the substances2 that exemplify them. It is important to note that this 
conception of tropes does not entail nominalism. The conception of tropes I will rely on in 
this paper is neutral as to whether tropes are particular instances of universals (as realists 
claim) or not (as nominalists claim).3 
                                                 
1
 There are obviously exceptions to this. Thus, Campbell (1981), Lowe (1998, 2008), Mulligan, Simons and 
Smith (1984) and Mulligan (1999) all argue that we perceive tropes and Burge (2010) at least seems sympathetic 
to the claim, whereas Levinson (2006) argues that we do not. Kriegel (2004) uses trope theory to illuminate the 
metaphysics of phenomenal states and Nanay (2012) uses it to illuminate intentional content, but they do not 
explicitly argue that we perceive tropes. I have however not come across any literature that discusses trope 
theory in relation to perceptual constancies and perceptions of change, which is what I will do in the present 
paper. 
2
 The term “substance” is used to refer to ordinary objects, such as cats, trees and stones.  
3
 The literature on tropes is vast. For nominalistic versions of trope theory, see for example Campbell (1981), 
Mulligan, Simons and Smith (1984), Williams (1953). For realistic versions of trope theory that combine a 
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   A recurring problem for most theories of perception is to determine the proper object of an 
act of perception.4 Is it a state of affairs, a substance or a trope? According to some the objects 
of normal acts of perception are substances, such as cars, cats, trees and human beings, but 
not states of affairs (Smith 1979). Others are happy to include both states of affairs and 
substances as the objects of perceptual acts (Searle 1983). Another option is to hold that it is 
tropes that are the immediate objects of perceptual acts, and that it is only through perceiving 
tropes that we are indirectly seeing substances (Campbell 1981, 481). A third option would be 
to claim that it is universals that are the immediate objects of perceptual acts (Johnston 2004). 
   My own position is inclusive. I will assume that we can perceive both properties and 
substances. There is no order of priority here. They are both the primary objects of a visual 
experience. I will argue that we are perceptually presented5 with properties as tropes. This 
claim is consistent with the notion that we can also be perceptually presented with universals.  
   The next section will present a couple of variations of an example of a perceptual illusion 
once introduced by David Woodruff Smith. Section three argues that these examples show 
that perception has a certain structure. Section four argues that these examples show that we 
can perceive tropes. The fifth section presents an argument against object-involving theories 
of phenomenal character. It is argued that the perceived tropes of a perceptual experience 
cannot be part of the phenomenal character of that experience. And the sixth section 
concludes the paper with some brief remarks on phenomenal tropes.  
 
 
2 Exploding Perceptions – Variations on a Smithian Theme 
 
David Woodruff Smith has in a series of papers (Smith 1979, 1984, 1986) and a book (Smith 
1989) argued that the descriptive content of an act of perception does not determine the 
reference of the said perception. Smith’s arguments are based on various thought experiments 
where we initially have a perceptual illusion and subsequently realize that we have been the 
subjects of such an illusion. 
   In “The Case of the Exploding Perception”, Smith presents a variety of examples of 
perceptual illusions. Let us take a look at the first of these cases: 
 
(a) A man called “Smith” approaches a bobby at the London Wax Museum. As he starts 
talking to him, he realises that he is not talking to a bobby at all. He is not even talking to a 
human being but to a figure of wax. (Smith 1979, 239) 
 
When Smith the tourist realises that he is not talking to a bobby but to a figure of wax, his 
perception explodes. Smith is well aware that a human being cannot be identical to a wax 
figure and that neither can it turn into one. The object before the explosion is classified as a 
human being, whereas it is classified as a wax figure after the explosion.  
  Smith is nevertheless in some sense presented with the same object before and after the 
explosion. It is true that the object is classified as belonging to different kinds before and after 
the explosion. But it is the same object that is classified in different ways. According to Smith 
the philosopher, the proper conclusion to draw from this example is that there are two types of 
                                                                                                                                                        
commitment to tropes with a commitment to universals, see for example Husserl (1901), Lowe (2006), Mertz 
(1996) and Svennerlind (2008). 
4
 The term “object” is used in as wide a sense as possible. Anything that a perception can be about, be it an 
event, a process, a substance, a property or a state of affairs, can thus be a perceptual object. 
5
 A note on formulations such as “x perceives y” and “x is perceptually presented with y”: Unless otherwise 
specified, I will use these formulations in the non-factive sense of x representing y, regardless of whether the 
perception is veridical. The formulation “x is perceptually related to y” will on the other hand be used in order to 
indicate that x is veridically perceiving y. 
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directedness involved in this case, one of acquaintance and one of interpretation. The 
perceiver is throughout this process acquainted with the same object. But the object is 
interpreted differently before and after the explosion. It is important to note that the 
acquainting sense is independent of the classificatory sense. Smith is in this case perceptually 
related to a figure of wax throughout the process, but this figure is presented as a normal 
human being before the explosion and as a figure of wax after the explosion. (Smith 1979, 
243) 
   On Smith’s account the acquainting sense determines the reference to the object whereas the 
classificatory sense interprets the object as being of a certain kind. Smith compares his 
account to Husserl’s account of perception. Husserl distinguishes between two basic 
components in the act of perception: an X determining the particular object of perception and 
a descriptive content consisting of a complex of predicate senses referring to the properties of 
the object. Smith and Husserl agree that the descriptive content does not determine the object 
of perception. (Smith 1979, 258) 
   Smith and Husserl agree that it is the X-content, or the acquainting sense, that determines 
the object of the perception. This content is de re. It functions independently from the 
predicate senses attributing various properties to the object. We can perceive an object even if 
we are mistaken with respect to which properties the object has. Hence, it is because the X-
content is invariant that a sequence of perceptual acts with different descriptive contents 
nevertheless can present us with the same object. (Smith 1979, 258)  
   So far we have studied Smith’s account of how it is possible for us to be presented with 
substances such as human beings or figures of wax. I now want to make a suggestion that at 
first might sound astonishing. It is not only with respect to the perception of substances that 
we can distinguish between the X-content and the descriptive content. The perceptual content 
presenting us with the properties of a substance also has this structure. There is one sense that 
determines the particularity of the property, and one that determines the qualitative character. 
The qualitative character of a property can be conceived of as the universal the property is an 
instance of, or the resemblance class it belongs to, depending upon whether one is a realist or 
a nominalist with respect to properties.  
   Perceptual explosions can occur not only when we perceive substances, but also when we 
perceive properties. Consider first the following case: 
 
(b) Brian perceives a piece of ice melting. Gradually the colour of the ice turns from white to 
dark grey.  
 
In this case it is quite clear that Brian perceives an object that is gradually changing its 
properties with respect to colour. So, unlike the case described in (a), this is not a case of a 
perceptual explosion of any kind. The perception is veridical throughout the sequence and 
presents an object that is changing its colour. 
   Let us contrast these cases with two other cases, where there is a perceptual explosion 
involved. 
 
(c) Catherine is perceptually presented with a white cube. As she approaches the cube, she 
perceives that it is not white but dark grey. 
 
This is a normal case of discovering that one has been exposed to a perceptual illusion. It 
differs from (a) in the sense that it is not the kindhood of the substance that explodes. It differs 
from (b) in the sense that the property of the substance explodes. Unlike Brian, Catherine does 
not perceive the substance change its properties. Rather, she experiences a change in the way 
she is perceptually presented with the property. She realises that she has been mistaken about 
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the colour of the object, but she does not see the object change its colour. So we can call this a 
case of a property explosion (Smith 1979, 247 discusses a similar case). 
   Consider now a fourth case where the perception of a property is changing: 
 
(d) Diana perceives a ball but cannot clearly see the colour of it. As she goes nearer, the 
perception becomes more determinate. First she perceives that it is dark. Then she perceives 
that it is blue. Finally she perceives that it is navy blue. 
 
This case is different from (c) in that there is no illusion involved. Diana is not perceptually 
presented with any property of the object that it lacks.  
   The case described in (d) could probably best be illustrated by use of the notions of 
determinable and determinate (cf. Johnson 1921, 173ff). A determinable is a general property. 
Thus, colour and shape are determinables. When an object exemplifies a property, it always 
exemplifies a determinate property. Being cubical and being spherical are for example two 
determinate properties of the determinable shape. Determinates are obviously related to 
determinables. Whenever an object exemplifies a determinate, it also exemplifies its 
determinable (cf. Johansson 2000).  
   It is at this point worth noting that perceptual and linguistic representations often represent a 
property that is neither of the highest determinable (such as colour) or the lowest determinate 
(such as a specific shade of red), but rather a property that is neither at the highest nor at the 
lowest end of the scale (such as being red). These properties function as determinables in 
relation to some properties and as determinates in relation to other properties. 
   Armed with these resources we can now describe (d) as a case in which Diana gradually 
perceives the colour as more and more determinate. The perceptual content follows the scale 
from highest determinable (colour) to lowest determinate (navy blue) in the sense that it 
represents properties that are successively more determinate.  
  What characterizes cases (c) and (d) is that in one sense of the word, the substance is 
presented as having different properties throughout the specious present, but in another sense 
it is not. Catherine first perceives the substance as being white and then dark grey. And Diana 
goes from perceiving the substance as merely coloured to perceiving it as navy blue. So our 
cases are clearly different from ordinary cases of perceiving an object as having the same 
property over time.6 
   But our two cases are also different from perceptions of change. The object is not perceived 
as changing with respect to the property involved. Even though the property appears as 
successively more determinate, there is a sense in which Diana is perceptually presented with 
the same property. So in another sense of the word, the perceivers have no sense of perceiving 
different properties through time. We can express this by saying that the object of perception 
is characterized by a certain perceptual constancy. Let us consequently refer to case (b) as a 
case of property change and cases (c) and (d) as cases of property constancy. 
   In order to characterize these cases, I would like to make a tentative distinction between the 
sense of identity and the sense of quality in the perception of properties. Both the sense of 
identity and the sense of quality of the colour of the object is changing in Brian’s case. Hence, 
the object is perceived as changing. In the property constancy cases however, what is 
changing is the sense of the quality of the property. But even though the sense of quality is 
changing, the property itself is not perceived as changing since the sense of identity of the 
property is invariant throughout the sequence. 
                                                 
6
 They are also different from the phenomenon of colour constancy. In the latter case the phenomenal character 
may vary, but you are nevertheless presented with the same colour. One might for example perceive an instance 
of a specific shade of red as being the same instance of that specific shade of red even though the illumination in 
the room varies during the perception (cf. Chalmers 2006, 84ff, Mulligan 1999, 175). 
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3 The Intentional Structure of Perceiving Properties 
 
What lessons, if any, can be learned from the above cases? In the present section I shall argue 
that there is a clear phenomenological difference between case (b) on the one hand and cases 
(c) and (d) on the other hand. The difference is not merely that Brian judges that the object is 
changing whereas Catherine and Diana judges that the object is not changing. The difference 
is a perceptual difference. 
   The argument that I am about to develop might be seen as a version of Siegel’s (2010) 
method of phenomenal contrast for discovering the content of a perceptual experience. The 
general idea behind Siegel’s method is to contrast two perceptions with different phenomenal 
characters and examine whether the phenomenal difference is best explained by there being a 
difference in content between the two cases. As Siegel attempts to outline a general theory for 
how to discover which properties can be presented in perceptual content her approach might 
seem suitable here.  
   There is however an important difference between Siegel’s method and my approach. My 
argument employs Siegel’s method up to a certain point. I will argue that contrasting cases 
can help us see the structure of the perceptual presentation of properties. I will subsequently 
argue that the best explanation for the fact that perception has this structure is that we 
perceive properties as tropes. 
   The alternative to conceive of the difference between property constancy and property 
change in terms of perceptual content would be to conceive of it as a difference in judgment. 
If there were no phenomenological difference between property constancy and property 
change, my distinction between the sense of identity and the sense of quality of the property 
would be superfluous. Sometimes we judge that the substance has changed, and sometimes 
that it has not changed. In cases (c) and (d) above, we judge that the substance has not 
changed. This, incidentally, seems to be Smith’s account of the phenomenon (Smith 1979, 
244f.). 
   The problem with this position is that cases of property constancy and property change are 
cognitively impenetrable. We perceive properties as constant or changing regardless of which 
judgments we make or which beliefs we have.  
   Consider for example a case of phenomenal vagueness. When looking at an object that is 
very slowly changing its shape, you will not see the object as changing. The perceptions 
exhibit property constancy. Yet if you look long enough at the object, you will after a certain 
period of time judge that the object has changed. So in this case you know that the object is 
continuously changing, but you do not perceive it. The situation is equivalent to the situation 
where you are looking at a clock. The hour hand is moving, and you know that it is moving. 
But you do not perceive it as moving. So a judgment to the effect that an object is changing in 
some respect is not a sufficient condition to actually see the object change. Nor is a judgment 
to the effect that an object is constant in some respect necessary in order to see the object as 
constant. 
   The same kind of argument can be construed with respect to perceptions of change and 
judgments of constancy. It is widely reported in the literature of perceptual illusions that an 
unchanging two-dimensional image in some cases can look like a three-dimensional object 
with an unstable and continuously changing shape. This is for example the case if a two-
dimensional image consists of a series of parallel lines. If the lines are arranged in a special 
way, so that some are grouped more closely than others, and if the perceiver attends to them 
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for a period of time, it might appear to the perceiver as if the two-dimensional surface of the 
paper is three-dimensional with moving waves. (Wade 1977)  
    A related kind of perceptual illusion concerns movement. It is frequently reported in the 
literature that we can perceive movement in a stationary image – this is the phenomenon 
known as anomalous motion. The most famous is presumably the Fraser-Wilcox illusion, 
which has been developed in various ways by Akiyoshi Kitaoka (2006) In the illusion, 
movement is represented as more intense in the periphery of the visual field than in the centre 
of the visual field.  
   In both our illusions we perceive some property changing, even though we know that there 
is nothing that actually changes. In the first case we perceive the shape of the surface 
changing. In the second case we perceive the surface moving. But the movement of the 
surface changes as our attention shifts. In both cases it will look to us as if the object is 
changing with respect to some property – shape or movement. But we will nevertheless know 
that it is not changing. So in this case we may assume that observers judge that the property is 
constant. Yet they will nevertheless perceive the object as changing. This indicates clearly 
that judgments of property-constancy are not sufficient in order for us to perceive an object as 
constant with respect to some property. But it also indicates that a judgment to the effect that 
the object is changing is not necessary in order to perceive it as changing. 
   If my argument so far is correct, judging that a property is constant is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition in order to perceive it as constant. And a judgment to the effect that 
an object is changing with respect to some property is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition in order to perceive it as changing with respect to that property. But this shows that 
the difference between property constancy and property change cannot be found at the level 
of judgment. It must rather be found at the level of perceptual content itself. 
   Granted that there is a real perceptual difference between property change and property 
constancy, the question arises what this difference consists in. Smith argues that the lesson 
from perceptual explosions is that we must differentiate between the descriptive predicate 
senses and the non-descriptive acquainting sense when perceiving a substance. The cases of 
Brian and Catherine suggest that our perceptions of properties must have an analogous 
structure. 
   If the difference between the two cases is that Catherine (but not Brian) perceives the colour 
of the object as constant, even though she (as Brian) is presented with a sequence of changing 
shades of colour, there must be something that accounts across time for the identity of the 
property. So, what differentiates the two cases is that Catherine’s perceptual content includes 
something that accounts for the identity of the property across time whereas Brian’s 
perceptual content includes something that accounts for his sense of being presented with 
different properties across the perceptual sequence. 
   I have previously made a tentative distinction between the sense of identity and the sense of 
quality of perceiving a property. We are now in a position to conceive of how they are 
connected. The sense of identity of a property is, I have said, what accounts for Catherine’s 
ability to see the object as having the same colour over time. The sense of quality, however, is 
what explains the fact that Catherine perceives the object as exemplifying different universals 
at different points in time. What characterises normal perceptual experiences is that the sense 
of identity changes when the sense of quality changes and vice versa. What characterises 
Catherine’s case however is that the sense of identity and the sense of quality in some sense 
come apart. 
    We can express this by saying that in the case of constancy, the sense of quality can vary 
throughout the perceptual sequence, though the sense of identity remains invariant or 
constant. In perceptions of change, however, the sense of identity is not invariant throughout 
the sequence, and neither is the sense of quality. It is at this point important to emphasize that 
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I am not claiming that a property has one part accounting for its identity and another part 
accounting for its quality. I am merely arguing that when we are perceptually presented with a 
property, perceptual content must be analysed as accounting for both the identity of the 
property and its quality. 
    Senses of identity and senses of quality may provisionally be conceived of as the parts of a 
Fregean perceptual content that represents properties of objects. Using the analogue with 
Smith’s Husserlian account, we can say that the sense of identity corresponds to the 
acquainting sense, whereas the sense of quality corresponds to the predicative senses. The 
sense of identity accounts for our perception of a property as identical over time, whereas the 
sense of quality accounts for our perception of an object as being in a certain way – for 
example as being blue or spherical. In section five I will present an explicit argument to the 
effect that these senses cannot consist of Russellian contents. 
   If my account of the structure of the perception of properties is correct, the general structure 
of a perceptual content, presenting an object exemplifying a monadic property at a given 
moment in time, would be the following: 
 
(i) X is Y with the quality Q 
 
In this case X presents an object, Y presents the identity of a property and Q presents the 
quality of the property. 
   In order to see how this works, let us analyse the perceptual experiences of Brian and 
Catherine across their temporal sequences. Let us assume that each of their sequences has four 
discernible temporal parts and that they are presented with the same quality at each temporal 
part. Brian’s perceptual content with respect to the presentation of the colour of the object 
would then have the following structure across the perceptual sequence: 
 
(b’) The piece of ice is (at t1 a with the quality white, at t2 b with the quality light grey, at t3 c 
with the quality grey, at t4 d with the quality dark grey) 
 
In this case the constants a-d are to be taken as not being identical and as expressing the 
shifting sense of the identity of the property. Catherine’s case will look slightly but 
importantly different: 
 
(c’) The cube is (at t1 a with the quality white, at t2 a with the quality light grey, at t3 a with 
the quality grey, at t4 a with the quality dark grey) 
 
In this case, the constant a is identical across the sequence and expresses what I have called 
the sense of identity of the property. That the sense of identity of the property remains 
constant across the entire sequence accounts for why Catherine perceives the property as 
constant even though her sense of the quality of the property varies across the sequence. 
   It is important to note that we need a sense of identity not only in order to explain cases 
where we continually experience some kind of perceptual explosion or illusion. It is also 
needed in order to account for cases such as (d), where the perceptual content presents us with 
an ever more determinate property across a perceptual sequence. In these cases the sense of 
quality is also changing. 
   Diana perceived a property as continuously more determinate. In her case, the part of the 
perceptual content presenting the colour of the ball would have the following structure: 
 
(d’) The ball is (at t1 a with the quality coloured, at t2 a with the quality dark, at t3 a with the 
quality blue, at t4 a with the quality navy blue) 
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Once again, the sense of identity of the property explains how we can see the ball as having 
the same colour, even though the sense of the quality of the colour varies across the sequence. 
   The lesson from cases (c) and (d) is that one can be perceptually related to a property even 
though the perceptual content does not present the exact quality of the property. Catherine’s 
sense of quality is not veridical. Diana is not until the end of the sequence presented with a 
lowest determinate of the property. Yet in both cases they are throughout their respective 
sequences perceptually related to the same property. So a correct presentation of the quality of 
the property is not necessary for being perceptually related to a property (cf Mulligan 1995, 
216 for a similar conclusion). 
   In this section I have argued that the perceptual content presenting an object as having a 
certain property consists of one sense presenting the object, one sense presenting the identity 
of the property, and one sense presenting the quality of the property. The natural question now 
is what the sense of identity and the sense of quality of a property refer to. This is the topic of 
the next section. 
 
 
4 Perceiving Tropes 
 
Let me begin this section by discussing what the sense of quality might refer to. In one sense, 
this problem has a rather simple solution. If we see an object as spherical and white, there is 
one sense of quality that accounts for why we see the object as spherical and another that 
accounts for why we see the object as white. The sense of quality is in other words what 
accounts for the fact that we see objects as being in certain ways. So, when the sense of 
quality is veridical, the sense of quality refers to whatever it is that makes white objects white 
and spherical objects spherical. 
   But in another sense, the solution to this problem is quite difficult. For it is a highly intricate 
question what it is that makes white objects white and spherical objects spherical. We can 
restrict the range of answers by assuming that there are properties and that these exist in re, 
that is, that they exist in ordinary substances. At this point we have to ponder whether 
universals figure in the solution to our problem or not. First, it might be held that there are no 
universals. It is tropes that make white objects white. Resemblance among objects is 
explained by the fact that different tropes can belong to the same resemblance class. Thus, 
what makes it the case that we perceive two properties as similar would be the fact that we 
perceive different tropes as belonging to the same resemblance class. On such an account, the 
sense of identity of a property would presumably refer to a trope and the sense of quality to a 
resemblance class of some kind.  
   On an alternative approach, we might assume that it is universals that make white objects 
white and spherical objects spherical. On such an account, the sense of quality would refer to 
a universal. Thus, what makes it the case that we perceive two objects as resembling each 
other would be the fact that we perceive them as exemplifying the same universal. 
    In the present paper I shall for the sake of simplicity assume that the sense of quality refers 
to a universal. One reason for this is dialectical – if we assume that the sense of quality refers 
to a resemblance class of tropes, we would have to assume that perceptions refer to tropes. 
But one of the purposes of this paper is to argue that we can perceive tropes. So that would 
beg the question. Another reason for this assumption is that I believe it to be correct. I believe 
that there are both universals and tropes, and that we can see both universals and tropes.  
   Let us now consider what the sense of identity of a property might refer to. If there are 
universals, one might suppose that both the sense of quality and the sense of identity refer to 
universals. But the problem with such an account is that it cannot explain perceptual 
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explosions. What characterises a property explosion is that the sense of quality is shifting over 
time, even though the sense of identity remains unchanging. But if the sense of quality and the 
sense of identity have the same reference, this would be problematic. For on such an account 
it would be hard to explain how the sense of quality might change but not the sense of 
identity.  
    But here it might perhaps be objected that the sense of identity does not refer to a 
determinate universal, but rather to a determinable universal. So, for example, whereas the 
sense of quality in a perceptual explosion first refers to cubicity and then to sphericity, the 
sense of identity would throughout the process refer to the determinable property being 
shaped.  
   Now, it might well be that we perceive determinables when we perceive determinates 
(Johansson 2000, 114ff.). But even if that is the case, the sense of identity cannot refer to 
determinables. In order to see this, let us once again return to the case of Brian. He is seeing 
the object change its colour. It goes from white to dark grey. But in this process the 
determinable colour will remain constant. He is seeing the object as coloured throughout the 
perceptual process. So the presentation of the determinable is not changing. But Brian is 
experiencing precisely a shifting sense of identity across this sequence. That is what 
distinguishes his case from that of Catherine’s case. So the sense of identity cannot be 
identical to the content presenting him with a universal determinable.7  
   But perhaps it might be argued that the sense of identity does not refer to a property at all, 
but rather to the object exemplifying the property? If the sense of identity refers to the object 
exemplifying the property, we would indeed have a nice explanation of cases involving 
property-constancy. But unfortunately such an account would fail to explain cases involving 
property change. For when we perceive that an object is changing in some way, the sense of 
identity of the property is changing. The object itself is however perceived as persisting. It is 
the same object that is perceived as exemplifying different properties over time. So it cannot 
be the case that the sense of identity (which is changing) derives its identity from the 
presentation of the object. For the object exemplifying the property is perceived as identical 
over time. 
    If the analysis so far is correct, the sense of identity does not refer to a universal. Nor does 
it refer to any substance. Could the sense of identity refer to some other entity? I have a hard 
time seeing what that entity might be, and I think that we may safely conclude that the 
conclusion so far must be that the sense of identity refers to a non-universal aspect of the 
property itself. 
   But the only non-universal aspect of a property that there could possibly be is the 
particularity of a property. If you perceive two different balls as white, only to realise in a 
perceptual explosion that one of the balls was not white after all, but rather grey, the senses of 
identity of the colour-properties of the balls are not changing. But it is patently not the case 
that they refer to the same entity. The sense of identity referring to the colour of the grey ball 
is clearly different from the sense of identity referring to the colour of the white ball. But 
since the senses of identity have not changed throughout the perceptual process, they must 
have been different from the beginning – where both balls were perceived as white. 
Consequently, it is the case that not even two objects which are perceived to exactly resemble 
each other or exemplify the same universal can be perceived to have identical properties. 
   But if this is the case, no two objects could ever be presented as having identical properties. 
The sense of identity of a property presented as exemplifying one object could never be 
identical to the sense of identity of a property presented as exemplifying another object. 
                                                 
7
 It is obviously possible to avoid this consequence by arguing that the sense of identity refers to a determinable-
trope. But that would be tantamount to accept that we perceive properties as tropes, which is the main claim in 
this section. 
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Properties are consequently presented as unrepeatable in the same way as the substances that 
are presented as exemplifying them. The sense of identity of a property refers to the 
particularity of a property. It refers to a trope.  
 
 
 
5 An Argument Against Property-Involving Accounts of Phenomenal Character 
 
If my arguments thus far are correct, they have important implications for the nature of the 
phenomenal character of our perceptions. More specifically, they indicate that perceptual 
experiences are not object-involving. Or, at the very least, they indicate that perceptual 
experiences are not constituted by the properties of the object perceived. The notion that the 
perceived object and its properties feature as constituents in perceptual experiences is a 
position that has been defended from two quite different angles in recent years. Thus, we find 
the position defended both by disjunctivists and by intentionalists subscribing to the notion 
that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is identical to the Russellian 
intentional content of the said experience.  
   The central tenet of disjunctivism is that veridical perceptual experiences are object-
involving, in the sense that the objects perceived feature in perceptual experiences, whereas 
non-veridical perceptual experiences are experiences of a different nature. We thus find 
Brewer declaring that “perception is an openness to, or acquaintance with, mind-independent 
empirical things themselves, whose basic natures and perceptible qualities constitute what it is 
like to be presented with them in this way” (Brewer 2004, 69). John Campbell on the other 
hand claims that “the phenomenal character of your experience, as you look around the room, 
is constituted by the actual layout of the room itself: which particular objects are there, their 
intrinsic properties, such as colour and shape, and how they are arranged in relation to one 
another and to you” (Campbell 2002, 116). And the same idea can be found in the work of 
Michael Martin: “Some of the objects of perception – the concrete individuals, their 
properties, the events these partake in – are constituents of the experience” (Martin 2004, 39). 
    So what characterises veridical perceptual experiences on the disjunctivist account is that 
the objects themselves enter into the perceptual experience. The same claim is also present in 
many intentionalists who believe that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is 
identical to its Russellian content. Here is for example a representative passage from Michael 
Tye: 
 
To see why, consider again what the thesis of transparency tells us. It tells us that in the case 
of perceptual experiences, the only qualities of which we are introspectively aware are 
qualities of external things if they are qualities of anything at all. But intuitively, we are aware 
of phenomenal character when we introspect. The conclusion to draw is that the phenomenal 
character of a perceptual experience consists in, and is no more than the complex of qualities 
the experience represents. Thus, the phenomenal character of the experience of red just is red. 
In being aware of red, I am aware of what it is like to experience red, since what it is like to 
experience red is simply red. (Tye 2009, 119) 
 
So, on Tye’s account, perceptions are transparent. We are not aware of anything but the 
intentional content of the experience. The intentional content however is constituted by the 
properties of the object of the perception. So the phenomenal character is constituted by the 
properties of the object of perception as well (cf. Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, Thau 2002). 
  It is important to note that on the Russellian conception, both veridical and non-veridical 
perceptions have Russellian content. Non-veridical perceptions are however not conceived as 
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object-involving in the sense that they contain the purported (and non-existing) object of 
perception. They do however contain the properties the non-existing object is presented as 
having. Here is David Chalmers explicating this position (which he does not defend): 
 
My visual experience when I look at a green ball has a certain object-involving content, but it 
seems that a phenomenally identical experience could lack that content, if I were looking at a 
different object, for example, or if I were hallucinating. (Some direct realists will deny this 
claim, but most contemporary representationalists accept it.) But in these cases, the property-
involving content of the original experience is still plausibly present: my visual experience 
still represents that there is a green object in front of me. (Chalmers 2004, 167) 
 
So the Russellian intentionalist will claim that intentional content is even in non-veridical 
cases constituted by the properties the perception is about. This seems to differentiate the 
Russellian from the disjunctivist. 
    The disjunctivist and the Russellian offer a similar account of veridical perceptual 
experiences. If we perceive an entity and its properties, these properties feature as the 
constituents of the phenomenal character of the visual perception. On both accounts, veridical 
perceptions are property-involving in the sense that they are constituted by the properties of 
the object perceived. 
   In order to see what is wrong with such accounts we need to make the assumption that there 
are tropes. This is an assumption that the defender of property-involving content would better 
accept. For if my argument so far is correct, we can only perceive properties as tropes. So if 
perceptual content can present us with tropes, the defender of property-involving content 
would have to accept that there are tropes. Any veridical perceptual experience of a trope 
would on the property-involving theory of perception have the trope itself as a constituent.  
    Let us now proceed to consider whether perceptual experiences can be object-involving or 
property-involving in the sense that they have the tropes perceived as constituents. I shall 
argue that this is not the case. I have two arguments. First, property-involving accounts of 
phenomenal character cannot explain perceptual explosions. Secondly, they cannot explain 
cases of determinable-constancy. 
    Consider first of all the case of Catherine! She approaches a cube that she initially 
perceives as white. However, she experiences a perceptual explosion and starts perceiving the 
cube as grey. If my account is correct, the sense of identity of the property will remain 
invariant. But the sense of quality of the property will change. 
   Whereas one object can change with respect to which property it exemplifies, tropes 
themselves cannot change. A trope cannot first exemplify one universal and subsequently 
exemplify another universal.8 But clearly, perceptual explosions involve a change with respect 
to the property presented. In the case of Catherine, the trope is first presented as white, and 
subsequently as grey. But no trope could be first white and then grey. So, clearly, the trope 
itself is not a constituent of Catherine’s perceptual experience. For Catherine’s perceptual 
experience is changing with respect to colour, but the trope is not changing. 
    There are two possible ways to object to this argument. First of all, it might be argued that 
the trope is a constituent of the perceptual experience before and after the explosion. But this 
objection fails to explain the fact that the perception explodes. The sense of quality of the 
perception is changing in a perceptual explosion. But the perceived trope is not changing. So 
it is hard to see how the purported presence of the trope in the perceptual experience could 
explain the fact that the perception explodes.  
                                                 
8
 Tropes can however change the relations they bear to various entities. They can also change position in 
spacetime. But this obviously does not mean that they can exemplify different universals, merely that they can be 
the relata of different relations.  
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   A second objection is more promising. It might well be argued from a disjunctivist point of 
view that the perceptual explosion consists of one veridical experience and one non-veridical 
experience. So, the trope perceived is only present in the veridical experience, but not in the 
non-veridical experience.  
   Any such account would however fail to explain our original distinction between 
perceptions of change and perceptual explosions. For consider a case where someone, let us 
call him Colin, would erroneously perceive that an object changed from white to grey. In this 
case the object would be grey throughout the perceptual process, but Colin would perceive the 
object changing from white to grey. So, presumably, his perception is only property-involving 
after the perceptual presentation of change. 
   The problem is that if Catherine’s perceptual experience before the explosion is not 
property-involving, there would be nothing on the property-involving account that 
distinguished her experience from the experience of Colin. Both initially perceive the object 
as white. When they do this, the experience is by assumption not property-involving. But it is 
property-involving when they perceive the object as grey. But then it is hard to see what the 
difference could be between the two cases.  
    The problem that perceptual explosions raises for the disjunctivist and the Russellian is that 
if the property is involved in the perception before and after the explosion, it becomes very 
hard to explain what it is that explodes. But if the property is only present in the perception 
after the explosion, it is hard to see how anything could explode. It will rather look like a 
normal perception of change. So, I conclude that Russellian and disjunctivist claims to the 
effect that perceptual experiences are property-involving cannot explain cases of perceptual 
explosions. 
   My second argument is that property-involving accounts cannot explain cases of 
determinable-constancy. Determinable constancy involves cases where the sense of identity is 
invariant, but where the sense of quality becomes more (or less) determinate. Thus, Diana 
goes from successively perceiving a ball as dark to navy blue. But she does not perceive the 
ball change with respect to colour.  
   Let us now make the assumption that Diana’s perception is veridical throughout the 
perceptual process. It is clearly not the case that she is hallucinating or having an illusion. The 
ball is really navy blue. So, her successive perceptions of the ball as dark, blue and navy blue 
are all veridical. 
   It seems to me that there are two good reasons to believe that these cases show that 
perceptions are not property-involving. First of all, if Diana’s perception of the ball as blue 
were veridical, the perceptual experience would not be constituted by the property navy blue, 
but rather by the property blue, where the latter has navy blue as one of its possible 
determinates. The determinate property navy blue would not be a constituent of the perceptual 
experience at that moment in time since the object is not perceived as navy blue. 
   So the property-involving account of phenomenal character would have to defend the notion 
that there are properties that are neither highest determinables nor lowest determinates. 
Diana’s ball would have an almost infinite amount of colour tropes, one making it navy blue, 
another making it blue, yet a further trope making it dark, and so on and so forth.  
   Now, there are some philosophers who defend the notion that there are properties of the 
highest determinable in addition to those of the lowest determinate (Johansson 2000). But the 
present claim would lead to a highly inflated ontology where there would be properties for 
every position in between the highest determinable and the lowest determinate. And whereas 
there are some philosophers (Wilson 2012, Matthen 2005, 101ff.) who seem to accept that 
there can be properties lying between the highest determinable and the lowest determinate, it 
is a very controversial position. And the present author, for one, has a very hard time seeing 
why we should accept such an ontological inflation.  
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   But even if we for some reason were to accept that there are properties which are neither 
lowest determinates nor highest determinables, there is a second problem with the property-
involving account of determinable-constancy. Even if Diana’s ball had a blueness-trope, that 
would be a different trope than the navy-blue trope. So, in this case there would, after all, be 
successively different tropes involved in her perceptions. But then she would not, after all, 
perceive the same trope over time. The sense of identity of the property would therefore not 
be invariant.  
 
 
6 Phenomenal Tropes and the Perception of Properties 
 
I have argued that the phenomenal character of a visual experience is not property-involving. 
But there is nevertheless a sense in which the phenomenal character of a visual experience is 
constituted by tropes. If we assume that there are properties, it is reasonable to assume that 
phenomenal states have properties too. And if properties are tropes, then the phenomenal 
character of the perception will be constituted by tropes as well. These tropes are however not 
mind-independent – as the disjunctivist and the Russellian would claim. Following Kriegel 
(2004), we may call these tropes “phenomenal tropes”.  
   If we assume that there are phenomenal tropes, we can easily explain the problematic cases 
of property-constancy. Senses of identity and senses of quality might presumably be identified 
with phenomenal tropes. Both make a contribution to the overall phenomenal character of the 
perceptual experience, and they are not properties of the object perceived. Presumably, they 
bear an intricate relationship to each other. I would suggest that senses of identity supervene 
on a successive series of senses of qualities.  
   Consider once again the case of Diana. It is true that the phenomenal character of her 
perceptual experience is changing. Consequently, a succession of different phenomenal tropes 
may constitute a succession of senses of qualities: one representing dark, one representing 
blue and one representing navy blue. A phenomenal trope constituting the sense of identity 
would then supervene on this sequence. Whereas some of these tropes may well fail to 
represent the lowest determinate of the property colour, the phenomenal tropes themselves 
may well be of the lowest determinate. Something similar would be true of property-
explosions. Only in this case the phenomenal tropes involved would be different. However, a 
full defence and elaboration of these ideas falls beyond the scope of the present paper.9 
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